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Journal of Clinical Microbiology, May 1999, p. 1612-1616, Vol. 37, No. 5
0095-1137/99/$04.00+0
Pseudoepidemic of Aspergillus niger Infections Traced
to Specimen Contamination in the Microbiology Laboratory
Valerie L.
Laurel,1,*
Patricia A.
Meier,1,2
Alicia
Astorga,2
Donna
Dolan,2
Royce
Brockett,2 and
Michael
G.
Rinaldi3
Division of Infectious Diseases, Department of
Medicine,1 and Department of
Microbiology,2 Wilford Hall Medical Center,
San Antonio, Texas 78236, and Pathology and Laboratory Medicine
Services, Audie L. Murphy Memorial Veterans Affairs Hospital, San
Antonio, Texas 782843
Received 21 September 1998/Returned for modification 26 October
1998/Accepted 13 February 1999
 |
ABSTRACT |
We report a pseudo-outbreak of Aspergillus niger that
followed building construction in our clinical microbiology laboratory. Because outbreaks of invasive aspergillosis have been linked to hospital construction, strategies to minimize dust in patient care
areas are common practice. We illustrate that the impact of
false-positive cultures on patient care should compel laboratories to
prevent specimen contamination during construction.
 |
TEXT |
Aspergillus species are
ubiquitous fungi (13). Invasive aspergillosis (IA), which is
often fatal, is the second most common opportunistic mycosis, after
candidiasis, affecting humans (13). Of the more than 200 Aspergillus species known, Aspergillus fumigatus and Aspergillus flavus are frequently noted to cause
infections in immunocompromised patients. In certain high-risk
populations, such as bone marrow transplant recipients (3,
12), the attributable mortality rate approaches 85 to 95%
(3, 10). Outbreaks of Aspergillus infection have
been reported in association with hospital construction (1, 6, 7,
14), prompting experts to recommend strategies for minimizing
dust production in areas where high-risk patients may be exposed
(1, 11, 12, 14).
Although the consequences of construction in patient care areas are
well described (1, 6, 7, 11, 14), the aftermath of
construction that occurs in non-patient care areas is rarely discussed.
We investigated a cluster of Aspergillus niger cultures that
were obtained during construction in our clinical microbiology laboratory and here suggest ways to minimize specimen contamination during periods of construction.
During the period of July to September 1996, A. niger was
isolated from 17 clinical specimens ("clinical specimens" refers to
all tissue, blood, sputum, cerebrospinal fluid (CSF), and urine specimens presented for routine bacterial culture) (Table
1) submitted for 15 inpatients at our
hospital (6.4/10,000 patient days), compared to A. niger
isolation from 2 inpatients in the preceding 12 months (0.17/10,000
patient days) (rate ratio [RR], 7.50 [RR is the ratio of two
instantaneous incidence rates, i.e., the incidence rate of cultures
positive for A. niger during the pseudoepidemic period
compared to the incidence rate of cultures positive for A. niger during the pre-pseudoepidemic period.]; 95% confidence
interval [CI95], 1.74 to 67.59 [CI95
indicates that there is a 95% probability that the true value lies
between the confidence limits. A CI95 that does not include
1.0 is similar to finding that the association is statistically
significant.]; P = 0.002). During the epidemic period,
the overall rate of isolation of A. niger from clinical
specimens was 7.9 per 100,000 clinical specimens, compared to 0.73 per
100,000 specimens in the preceding 9 months (RR, 10.82;
CI95, 1.28 to 887.92; P = 0.005) (Fig.
1). Initially, we heard of this potential
outbreak as A. niger was being isolated from patients in the
intensive care unit for whom the pretest probability of infection was
high; these included three neutropenic patients, two bone marrow
transplant patients, and three solid organ transplant patients. We
discovered, however, that A. niger was also being isolated
from patients with no recognizable risk factors for IA, including one
patient whose urine specimen was collected during a routine obstetrical
evaluation. We initiated an investigation in order to determine the
etiology of this increased rate of isolation of A. niger
from clinical specimens.
Using standardized definitions of nosocomial pneumonia, invasive
pulmonary aspergillosis, disseminated extrapulmonary aspergillosis, and
local extrapulmonary aspergillosis (4, 13), we reviewed all
cases to determine if the patients were infected with A. niger and whether the infections were nosocomial. No inpatients
met our criteria for a definite case of nosocomial IA, either pulmonary or extrapulmonary. One inpatient was initially classified as possibly infected because he had a positive culture and a compatible clinical syndrome. We determined that 14 inpatients were unlikely to be infected
because they (i) had no clinical manifestation of disease, (ii) went
untreated without adverse sequelae, or (iii) had a dedicated fungal
culture that was negative.
We discovered that nine patients had specimens that were split at the
point of collection, with one part going directly to the mycology
laboratory for fungal culture while the remainder was sent to the main
microbiology laboratory for bacterial culture. When specimens were
split as such, A. niger was isolated from the portion
processed in the main microbiology laboratory but not from the portion
plated explicitly for fungi. We concluded that either patient
colonization or contamination occurring during collection and transport
of specimens was an unlikely explanation for the increased number of
positive cultures being reported.
We conducted a series of experiments in the microbiology laboratory to
investigate possible sources of contamination with A. niger.
We noted that many of the positive cultures (12 of 26, 46%) were from
specimens plated on buffered charcoal yeast extract (BCYE) medium, the
medium that is routinely used in our laboratory for isolation of
Legionella spp. Unlike standard blood plates that are held
for 48 to 72 h, BCYE plates are held for 7 days, allowing
additional time for growth of A. niger. We suspected that
growth was detected on BCYE agar because these plates were held longer
than the standard blood plates, but we also considered that A. niger may grow preferentially on BCYE medium due to nutrients in
the BCYE medium (5). After performing sterility checks on our BCYE and blood agar plates, we used both in a subsequent series of
experiments. (In retrospect, we acknowledge that conventional mold
agars would have been more appropriate and less expensive in looking
for environmental sources of A. niger.)
Experiment 1.
BCYE settle plates were left open for 48 h
throughout the microbiology laboratory, including the specimen
evaluation benches. Similarly, BCYE plates were left open for 24 h
in the incubators, including the one used for respiratory specimens.
Although specimens are initially processed in the central microbiology
laboratory biological safety cabinet (BSC), we wanted to analyze all
areas within the laboratory where plates are screened, assessed, or incubated. These settle plates showed no growth of mold after one week
of incubation.
Experiment 2.
Sterile water, instead of sputum, was plated
onto six BCYE agar plates by the standard laboratory protocol for
plating of Legionella cultures. These plates were incubated
and checked daily to simulate what is normally done with respiratory
cultures that are submitted for Legionella detection. These
showed no growth after 1 week of incubation.
Experiment 3.
To evaluate the integrity of the central
microbiology laboratory BSC, six settle plates were placed in the back
of the BSC while the cultures in experiment 2 were being done. Three
BCYE plates and three blood plates were left open for 5 min to
approximate normal processing time. The plates were incubated and
checked daily for growth. On the 4th day, a black mold, which was later identified as A. niger, was present on one of three BCYE plates.
Experiment 4.
Next, we inspected the central microbiology
laboratory BSC, which is the standard receiving point for all specimens
entering the bacteriology section of the microbiology laboratory. We
noted a fine black dust on the interior ceiling of the BSC, on the
vortex machine that was inside the BSC, and on the BSC floor beneath the vortex machine. Laboratory personnel denied using a Bunsen burner
or other soot-producing device inside the BSC that could explain the
black dust. Using a sterile swab, we took specimens from all three
locations, plated them directly on Sabouraud-dextrose agar slants, and
incubated them at 34 to 37°C in the mycology laboratory's incubator.
The mycology laboratory is physically separated from the main
microbiology laboratory. After 1 week, A. niger grew from
two of three specimens.
Experiment 5.
While inspecting the area around the BSC, we
found that the medium plates stored on the laboratory bench immediately
adjacent to the BSC were dusty. BCYE plates were not kept in the area
adjacent to the BSC; therefore, we did not suspect that the medium was contaminated prior to specimen processing. The ceiling tiles above the
medium plates were dusty as well, and a culture of one of the ceiling
tiles grew A. niger.
As a control measure, the central processing area of the microbiology
laboratory was thoroughly cleaned. We discovered that the BSC had been
installed and certified in May 1996; it was not due to be inspected
again until November. Given our findings, laboratory personnel
disassembled and cleaned the BSC with Wex-cide (0.026%
o-phenylphenol, 0.023%
o-benzyl-p-chlorophenol, 99.951% inert
ingredients) solution. According to their report, the bottommost panel
of the BSC was covered with a black material, but unfortunately no
cultures were taken. After the BSC was cleaned, BCYE plates were again
placed in the BSC for 5 to 10 min during specimen processing. After 7 days of incubation, there was no growth on any of these plates.
Although the BSC was disassembled and cleaned in October, there were
six more reports of A. niger through the next month. In
November, the BSC failed its filter inspection, and the high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters were replaced approximately 4.5 years
before their predicted life expectancy of 5 years. After the visibly
dust-clogged HEPA filters were replaced, the pseudo-outbreak was terminated.
While inquiring about the BSC installation, we learned that other
construction had occurred in the laboratory in the early
summer months.
After the BSC was installed in the laboratory in
May, a project was
started in July to revise the ventilation system
for the pediatric
clinic, which is situated one floor below the
microbiology laboratory.
A new ventilation duct, extending from
the pediatrics clinic through
the microbiology laboratory, was
installed immediately adjacent to the
BSC. To construct the new
duct, workers used jackhammers to remove a 6- by 6-ft area in
the ceiling. The workers used the ceiling area directly
over the
specimen processing bench and immediately adjacent to the BSC
as a "crawl space." No barriers were erected to minimize dust
production in the laboratory, and specimen processing continued
as
usual throughout the time of construction. Specimens were plated
in the
BSC with HEPA filters running as
usual.
This apparent breakdown in a pragmatic approach to prevention of
contamination highlighted the need for standardized written
instructions for the BSC. Procedures prior to this episode covered
routine decontamination of work surfaces and annual recertification,
filter, and airflow checks of the BSC. There had been no evidence
that
the HEPA filters were not functioning properly prior to the
pseudoepidemic. As a result of this investigation, the laboratory
supervisor wrote a set of operating instructions to address the
cleaning and maintenance of the BSC beyond routine surface
decontamination
and required annual certification of filters and
airflow. We found
that the
Manual of Clinical Microbiology
(
8a) did not offer
specific guidelines for microbiology
laboratories undergoing construction;
therefore, we developed
recommendations to be used in our laboratory
whenever future
construction activities are planned (Table
2).
With assistance from the
manufacturer, we developed specific recommendations
for handling the
BSC and HEPA filters when dust-generating activities
are anticipated
(Table
2).
View this table:
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|
TABLE 2.
Recommendations for use in the clinical laboratory when
construction or dust-generating activities are planned
|
|
Like other pseudoepidemics in which true clusters of false infections
are identified, our false-positive cultures did not
correlate with our
patients' clinical conditions (
2). Like
the pseudoepidemic
described by Norden, in which seven patients
were unnecessarily treated
for presumed
Escherichia coli bacteremia,
our false-positive
cultures also generated unnecessary procedures,
treatments, and
consultations. For example, six patients were
prescribed antifungal
medications. Additionally, these "positive"
reports generated six
consultations: three to the infectious diseases
service and one each to
the renal, allergy, and pulmonary services.
Multiple laboratory studies
were required either to clarify the
diagnosis (e.g.,
Aspergillus serum precipitins) or to monitor
side effects of
therapy (e.g., renal function tests when amphotericin
was prescribed).
One 14-year-old patient was asked to return for
a repeat lumbar
puncture due to reported growth of
A. niger from
her CSF
specimen. We found one other reported pseudoepidemic of
aspergillosis,
which was traced to blood culture bottles that
had become contaminated
while stored in the same room as
Aspergillus isolates. In
that pseudoepidemic, at least 12 patients were treated
unnecessarily
with amphotericin B (
15).
Since true outbreaks of nosocomial aspergillosis are much more
devastating, recommendations for protecting the most immunocompromised
patients include use of special air filtration units, periodic
reviews
of air handling systems, periodic air sampling, and closing
of doors
and windows to prevent circumvention of the air filter
system
(
14). Because a significant amount of dust is generated
during construction activities, specific measures for minimizing
dust
during construction have been proposed. Pannuti recommends
isolating
construction sites with airtight plastic or drywall
barriers, using
negative-pressure ventilation in the work area,
decontaminating the
area thoroughly after construction, and using
a fungicide on
construction material that is potentially wet or
nutritive
(
11).
Fortunately, our outbreak was due to specimen contamination rather than
infection with
Aspergillus. We propose that methods
such as
those used to protect patients from potential exposure
to
Aspergillus conidia be modified for use in the laboratory.
When specimens are not protected from construction dust or its
remnants, they can easily become contaminated. If the patients
from
whom these specimens are collected are immunocompromised,
it can be
particularly difficult to elucidate whether they are
infected or not;
therefore, unnecessary testing and treatment
may ensue. If we can
eliminate false-positive cultures by protecting
laboratory specimens,
then unnecessary costs, procedures, and
potential complications can be
spared.
In summary, we investigated and terminated a pseudoepidemic of
A. niger cultures that we traced to specimen contamination
in the
microbiology laboratory during construction. Because false-positive
cultures impact patient care, laboratories should be prepared
to
institute precautions to protect clinical specimens during
dust-generating activities such as building
construction.
 |
FOOTNOTES |
*
Corresponding author. Mailing address: Wilford Hall
Medical Center, 2200 Bergquist Dr., Suite 1, MMII, Lackland AFB, TX
78236-5300. Phone: (210) 292-7444. Fax: (210) 292-3740. E-mail:
laurel{at}whmc.af.mil.
 |
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Journal of Clinical Microbiology, May 1999, p. 1612-1616, Vol. 37, No. 5
0095-1137/99/$04.00+0