Journal of Clinical Microbiology, December 2001, p. 4566-4567, Vol. 39, No. 12
0095-1137/01/$04.00+0 DOI: 10.1128/JCM.39.12.4566-4567.2001
Copyright © 2001, American Society for Microbiology. All rights reserved.
Molecular Investigation of the Aum Shinrikyo
Anthrax Release in Kameido, Japan
Paul
Keim,1,*
Kimothy L.
Smith,1
Christine
Keys,1
Hiroshi
Takahashi,2
Takeshi
Kurata,3 and
Arnold
Kaufmann4
Department of Biological Sciences, Northern
Arizona University, Flagstaff, Arizona
86011-56401; Infectious Disease
Surveillance Center2 and Office of
Directors,3 National Institute of Infectious
Diseases, Toyama 1-23-1, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo, 162-8640 Japan; and
Stone Mountain, Georgia4
Received 5 July 2001/Returned for modification 8 September
2001/Accepted 5 October 2001
 |
ABSTRACT |
In 1993, the Aum Shinrikyo cult aerosolized Bacillus
anthracis spores over Kameido, Japan. Spore samples were
obtained from the release site, cultured, and characterized by
molecular genetic typing. The isolates were consistent with strain
Sterne 34F2, which is used in Japan for animal prophylaxis against anthrax.
 |
TEXT |
Strain identification in
Bacillus anthracis has been problematic due to a lack of
distinguishing features, both phenotypic and molecular
(1). With the identification of variable-number tandem
repeats (VNTRs), identification of strains (unique genotypes) by
multiple-locus VNTR analysis (MLVA) is now possible, and
worldwide clone-based diversity patterns have been demonstrated
(2). The VNTR loci are hypervariable and have multiple
allelic states that provide high discrimination capacity for
differentiating among strains and for identifying evolutionary
relationships. There are about six major worldwide clonal lineages and
nearly 100 unique types now known.
We recently applied this typing system to a forensic study of a
B. anthracis strain associated with the Aum Shinrikyo
cult's activities. Our objective was to determine whether the strain was similar to any other previously known types from our studies of
B. anthracis worldwide diversity (2). This
information could potentially identify the origin of the strain used in
the bioterrorism attack and provide insights into how or why the attack
was carried out.
In June 1993, the Aum Shinrikyo cult sprayed a liquid suspension of
B. anthracis from their headquarters building in Kameido, near Tokyo, Japan (3; H. Takahashi, A. Kaufmann, K. L. Smith, P. Keim, and K. Taniguchi, Program 4th Int. Anthrax Conf., p. 27, 2001). While this aerosolization went largely unnoticed, the cult's later (1995) sarin gas attack of a Tokyo subway attracted worldwide attention. It was only with testimony of cult members and a
retrospective investigation (3; Takahashi et al., 4th Int.
Anthrax Conf.) that the 1993 incident was recognized as an anthrax
release. The cult had developed and constructed a delivery system that
involved the pumping of a liquid bacterial suspension up eight floors
of their headquarters building to an aerosol dispersal device on the
roof. During the aerosol dispersal, health authorities received
numerous public complaints concerning odors emanating from the
building. Upon investigation, they observed and collected a fluid from
the outside of the building. An archived (stored at 4°C) portion of
this fluid was analyzed in this study.
We examined the fluid collected from the Aum Shinrikyo headquarters for
bacterial content. Microscopically, malachite green and safranin
staining revealed stained spores, a large amount of debris, and other
bacterial cells. Aliquots of the fluid were cultured by spreading on
sheep blood agar plates and incubated at 37°C under ambient
CO2 concentrations. Approximately 4 × 104 CFU per ml were observed, though most of the
colonies grew only weakly. This weak growth was inconsistent with
normal B. anthracis characteristics under these conditions,
and we did not investigate these poorly growing bacteria further. About
10% of the colonies were typical of B. anthracis and had
robust nonhemolytic "gray ground glass" colonies, ca. 4 × 103 CFU per ml. Forty-eight of these colonies
were purified by single-colony streaking and subjected to MLVA. All 48 isolated colonies were determined to be B. anthracis and to
have identical MLVA genotypes. The DNA isolation and MLVA genotyping
were performed as previously described (2), and results
were then compared to an electronic database of worldwide B. anthracis isolates. The eight VNTR marker analyses resulted in
specific PCR amplicon sizes that had been previously observed only in
B. anthracis. All 48 isolates had the following genotype:
vrrA, 313 bp; vrrB1, 229 bp;
vrrB2, 162 bp; vrrC1, 583 bp; vrrC2, 532 bp; CG3, 158 bp; pXO1-aat, 129 bp; pXO2-at, no amplification. The lack of PCR amplification at
the pXO2 markers is consistent with strains that are missing the pXO2 plasmid entirely.
The MLVA genotype and the lack of amplification from the pXO2-at marker
were consistent with results obtained with the Sterne vaccine strain.
The Sterne strain is a member of the A3.b diversity cluster, and only
four naturally occurring B. anthracis strains had the same
seven-marker genotype (2). No other natural isolate that
is also missing the pXO2 plasmid marker with this genotype has been
observed. Given the commercial availability of the Sterne 34F2 vaccine
strain in Japan for veterinary purposes, it is reasonable to conclude
that the B. anthracis strain collected from the Aum Shinrikyo headquarters building is indeed Sterne. There have been reports that the cult had obtained a veterinary vaccine strain of
anthrax (3). Our MLVA results substantiate this and lend credence to the scenario that the cult was using this strain in their
activities and possibly in bioterrorism attacks. It would seem to be a
relatively easy undertaking for the cult to obtain a vial of the animal
vaccine and cultivate the Sterne strain. It is clear from our analysis
that the B. anthracis dispersal by the Aum Shinrikyo had
little possibility for endangering human life.
 |
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS |
This work was supported by funding from the CBNP-NN20 program at
the U.S. Department of Energy, the National Institutes of Health
(RO1-GM60795), and the Cowden Endowment in Microbiology.
 |
FOOTNOTES |
*
Corresponding author. Mailing address: Department of
Biological Sciences, Northern Arizona University, Flagstaff, AZ
86011-5640. Phone: (928) 523-1078. Fax: (928) 523-0639. E-mail:
Paul.Keim{at}NAU.EDU.
 |
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Journal of Clinical Microbiology, December 2001, p. 4566-4567, Vol. 39, No. 12
0095-1137/01/$04.00+0 DOI: 10.1128/JCM.39.12.4566-4567.2001
Copyright © 2001, American Society for Microbiology. All rights reserved.