

1 **Rising Stakes for Healthcare-Associated Infection Prevention: Implications for the**
2 **Clinical Microbiology Laboratory (REVISED)**

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20 **Abstract:**

21 Healthcare associated infection (HAI) rates are subject to public reporting, and are linked
22 to hospital reimbursement from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).
23 The increasing pressure to lower HAI rates comes at a time when advances in the
24 clinical microbiology laboratory (CML) provide more precise and sensitive tests, altering
25 HAI detection in ways that may increase reported HAI rates. I review how changing CML
26 practices can impact HAI rates, and how the financial implications of HAI metrics may
27 produce pressure to change diagnostic testing practices. Finally, I provide suggestions
28 for how to respond to this rapidly changing environment.

29

30 **Scenario 1.** During an investigation of rising rates of central-line associated
31 bloodstream infection (CLABSI), the infection prevention program (IPP) notes that some
32 CLABSIs were due to organisms that grew in only one of several blood cultures, and
33 which prior to the institution of matrix-assisted laser desorption/ ionization time of flight
34 (MALDI-TOF) for organism identification would have been classified as contaminants.
35 An example included a CLABSI attributed to an unusual species of *Actinomyces* that
36 previously would have been categorized as a “diphtheroid”. Your hospital leadership
37 requests that you either revert to former identification methods or change your reporting
38 in a way that prevents these events from being classified as CLABSIs.

39 **Scenario 2.** Since you changed to a nucleic acid amplification test (NAAT) for
40 *Clostridium difficile* detection, your positivity rate has increased by over 100%. The rate
41 of hospital-onset *C. difficile* infection (HO-CDI) has increased similarly. During an
42 investigation of the increase in CDI, you find that many samples positive by NAAT are
43 toxin negative by enzyme immunoassay (EIA), and that many patients with low pretest
44 probability of disease are being tested. However, after an initiative to improve testing

45 practices, your hospital-onset CDI Lab ID-event rate remains high (standardized
46 infection ratio (SIR) >1). Concerned about how this rate will impact the value-based
47 purchasing (VBP) and healthcare-associated condition (HAC) scores, your hospital
48 leadership asks you to consider a change back to EIA for CDI diagnosis.

49 **Scenario 3.** Even after a campaign to reduce your hospital's rate of catheter-associated
50 urinary tract infection (CAUTI) through a reduction in catheter use and improvement in
51 catheter placement and care, the CAUTI rate remains unacceptably high. Your hospital
52 epidemiologist sets up a meeting with you, to discuss how to reduce the number of urine
53 cultures ordered or performed by the laboratory, as another way to reduce both the
54 CAUTI rate and unnecessary antibiotic use. She is open to almost any idea to reduce
55 culture ordering, from using "reflex testing" (culture only performed when urinalysis
56 reveals evidence for inflammation) to requiring laboratory director approval for every
57 urine culture ordered from catheterized inpatients.

58 **Pay for Performance and Healthcare Associated Infections**

59 The above scenarios are all based upon actual situations confronted by clinical
60 microbiologists in practice. In each case, the laboratory was asked to change its testing
61 approach in order to reduce the number of cases meeting a current National Healthcare
62 Safety Network (NHSN) HAI definition (1). There is no question that a renewed focus on
63 HAI reduction in U.S. hospitals is being driven in part by the relationship between HAI
64 rates and hospital reimbursement via the VBP and HAC-reduction programs (2, 3). Both
65 the VBP and HAC-reduction programs are administered by CMS in an effort to link
66 hospital payments to improvements in quality of care (2, 3). Table 1 describes
67 characteristics of each of these pay for performance programs, with a focus on the HAI
68 metrics that are included. All told, up to 3% of CMS payments are at risk, which can
69 amount to millions of dollars for a large medical center. Despite recent studies that

70 suggest VBP and HAC measures are not good indicators of hospital quality (4, 5), these
71 programs (or something similar) are likely to remain in place for the foreseeable future.
72 Of the five HAI metrics included in the VBP and HAC programs, four of them (CAUTI,
73 CLABSI, CDI, and hospital-onset methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus* (MRSA)
74 bloodstream infection) depend heavily on the results of a diagnostic test performed in
75 the CML. For two of the metrics (CDI and MRSA), the NHSN definition includes only the
76 positive test result, the admission date and unit ("Laboratory identified (LabID) events"
77 for CDI and MRSA bacteremia), with no additional patient-level clinical information (6).
78 In an effort to reduce subjectivity and facilitate electronic reporting, future definition
79 changes will likely rely more on objective results from electronic medical records, such
80 as laboratory test results, with less emphasis on clinical symptoms.

81 **Unintended Consequences for the Clinical Microbiology Laboratory**

82 At the same time, diagnostic technology is improving, allowing for greater precision and
83 sensitivity than ever before (7). These advances, while they have great potential to
84 improve patient care and outcomes, may also have the effect of increasing reportable
85 HAI rates. In Scenario 1 above, the greater precision in species identification provided
86 by MALDI-TOF may change the classification of some positive blood cultures from
87 contaminants to CLABSIs. The most common scenario leading to this result is the
88 finding of one blood culture positive (out of two or more) for an organism that can now be
89 identified to species level that previously would have been reported out using less
90 precise terminology (e.g. "diphtheroid"). In such cases, if the organism identified is not
91 on the NHSN list of common commensals, but the genus is included in the "all
92 organisms" list, the episode counts as a CLABSI (8). In Scenario 2 above, the increased
93 sensitivity of *C. difficile* NAAT results in a predictable increase in CDI rates of 50% or
94 more (9, 10). Although NHSN includes a "test method" variable in the risk adjustment

95 formula for HO-CDI rate calculations (11), the risk adjustment is clearly not adequate to
96 fully account for the increased sensitivity of NAAT. For example, at our center we used
97 an algorithm for CDI testing that allowed us to determine that our Standardized Infection
98 Ratio (SIR) using NAAT is nearly twice what it would be if we used EIA alone (0.95
99 versus 0.5) (12).

100 In an environment in which the stakes of each HAI are so high, and in which the only
101 acceptable HAI rate is zero, inclusion of diagnostic test results into HAI definitions
102 creates perverse incentives for hospitals to influence laboratory testing for reasons not
103 directly related to improved patient care. One incentive, as outlined above, is to choose
104 less sensitive tests (e.g. EIA rather than NAAT for CDI diagnosis), which has the obvious
105 drawback of failing to diagnose some patients who would benefit from treatment.

106 Another incentive is to reduce the number of diagnostic tests ordered. In Scenario 3, for
107 example, the lab director is faced with choosing the best option for limiting the ordering
108 of urine cultures in catheterized inpatients, as part of an effort to reduce the CAUTI rate.

109 Reducing diagnostic test utilization may not always be detrimental to patient care;
110 indeed, improved stewardship of diagnostic tests can benefit the patient as well as assist
111 in reducing reported HAI rates. The best example of this is CAUTI. Many institutions
112 have reported success in CAUTI reduction via approaches that have the effect of
113 reducing the number of urine cultures ordered or performed (13-15). In some cases the
114 interventions include application of guideline-driven culture practices (13, 15), while in
115 other cases “reflex testing” involves culturing urine only if evidence of inflammation is
116 found on urinalysis (UA) (14). Because most positive urine cultures in catheterized
117 patients represent catheter-associated asymptomatic bacteriuria (CA-ASB) and not
118 CAUTI, because most CA-ASB doesn’t progress to CAUTI (16), and because there are
119 so many other causes of fever in hospitalized patients, reducing urine culture ordering in

120 catheterized inpatients is a laudable goal and can both reduce the NHSN-defined CAUTI
121 rate and reduce unnecessary antibiotic use (14, 15). The same principle (restricting test
122 ordering to those patients with the highest pre-test probability of disease) can and should
123 be applied to CDI testing. Rather than adopting less sensitive tests for CDI, the CML
124 director should work with clinical partners to implement policies to limit more sensitive
125 (e.g. NAAT) testing to those truly at risk (e.g. antibiotic exposure, frequent liquid stools,
126 etc.). Up to half of hospitalized patients tested for CDI don't have significant diarrhea,
127 and over 40% in some studies were receiving laxatives (17). Testing patients with low
128 pre-test probability of CDI thus increases the likelihood that a positive test represents *C.*
129 *difficile* colonization rather than disease (18, 19). As for CAUTI, limiting test ordering for
130 CDI may not only reduce NHSN-defined HAI rates but may improve patient care and
131 improve antibiotic stewardship (18, 19).

132 In other situations, efforts to limit diagnostic testing may be misguided and detrimental to
133 patient care. In an effort to lower their CAUTI rate, one hospital implemented a policy of
134 treating all catheterized patients with a third generation cephalosporin if their UA
135 revealed inflammatory cells, performing culture only if signs and symptoms developed
136 later (personal communication). A recent publication from a different healthcare system
137 quotes a house officer describing their approach to a possible CLABSI: "There's like the
138 central line infection protocols.... If you suspect that anybody has any type of
139 bacteremia, you don't do a blood culture, you just do a urine culture and pull the lines ...
140 we just don't even test for it because the quality improvement then like marks you off"
141 (20). These limitations on diagnostic testing are obviously inappropriate and dangerous,
142 subjecting the patient to unnecessary antibiotic therapy, misdiagnosis, or worse. The
143 CDC and CMS have heard enough reports similar to those described above that they
144 jointly published a letter warning to hospitals that "depart[ing] from standard diagnostic

145 practices to avoid reporting infections to NHSN” can “put patients at risk”, leading to “use
146 of antibiotics that is not necessary, such as treatment for bacterial colonization rather
147 than infection, or antibiotic treatment that is not informed by culture results” (21).

148 At the other end of the diagnostic testing spectrum, some hospitals have established
149 protocols that include ordering tests upon admission in patients who have no signs or
150 symptoms of an infection. Examples include ordering urine culture or *C. difficile* NAAT
151 on all admitted patients, in order to detect asymptomatic bacteriuria or the *C. difficile*
152 carrier state. This ostensibly allows the hospital to claim that any subsequent infection
153 was present on admission and thus not reportable to NHSN as a HAI (21). Needless to
154 say, these practices also increase risk to patients by exposing some to unnecessary
155 antibiotic therapy, in addition to increasing hospital costs. Such approaches also belie a
156 fundamental misunderstanding of HAI surveillance and prevention. Most HAIs are due to
157 organisms that are part of the patient’s flora prior to the infection, and the fact that an
158 organism colonizes a patient’s urine, stool or nares doesn’t mean the hospital isn’t
159 responsible for preventing it from later causing disease.

160 Finally, even in the absence of attempts to change practices in order to lower HAI rates,
161 there is substantial background variation in diagnostic practice that makes inter-facility
162 comparison (which is what the VBP and HAC programs are based upon) problematic.
163 One study of 16 pediatric intensive care units found major differences across units in
164 several aspects of diagnosis of CLABSI, including basic blood culture practices (e.g.
165 volume, number, sites, frequency). The investigators then devised a “surveillance
166 aggressiveness score”, which (unsurprisingly) correlated with the units CLABSI rate (“the
167 harder you look, the more you find”) (22). As described above, these diagnostic practice
168 variations become even more problematic when public reporting and financial penalties
169 are introduced into the HAI prevention equation. As described by Dixon-Woods and

170 Perencevich, “policy moves have converted a locally useful surveillance measure into
171 what social scientists call a “reactive” measure: the kind of measure that modifies the
172 phenomenon under study and in the process changes the thing being measured. Put
173 bluntly, the more that organizations are incentivized by the prospect of shaming or
174 financial penalties to decrease sensitivity—and thus not to find cases—the less certain it
175 is that they are reporting a valid assessment of their infection rate” (23).

176 **The Use and Misuse of Surveillance Definitions**

177 It is useful to step back and consider the main purpose for which hospitals and
178 healthcare systems perform HAI surveillance, which is to help inform local infection
179 prevention efforts. Some important attributes of a good surveillance definition include
180 the use of objective data when possible, high inter-rater reliability, and consistent
181 application over time (24). Sensitivity is favored over specificity, so as not to miss
182 potentially preventable events, and some degree of misclassification is expected (which
183 will even out over time, provided the definitions are applied consistently). Ideally, the
184 data produced from such surveillance would be used at the local level to detect
185 outbreaks, to measure changes that result from new HAI prevention initiatives, and to
186 help set HAI prevention priorities during annual risk assessments.

187 Unfortunately, financial penalties based upon inter-facility comparisons place a great
188 deal of pressure on HAI surveillance metrics, which changes the metrics by distorting the
189 incentives associated with them. This phenomenon is not limited to the healthcare
190 setting. Whenever extreme pressure (in the form of financial rewards or penalties) is
191 placed on a metric, human nature guarantees that complications will follow—recent well-
192 publicized examples include widespread gaming that occurs when law enforcement is
193 under pressure to lower crime rates (25), or when teachers are under pressure to

194 improve student test scores (26). This phenomenon is known as Goodhart's law: "when
195 a measure become a target, it ceases to be a good measure" (23, 27, 28).
196 Thus one could argue that the best solution to this problem is to no longer tie inter-facility
197 comparisons of HAI rates to financial penalties. However, understandable consumer and
198 payer pressure to improve patient safety make this outcome unlikely. Therefore, as
199 clinical microbiologists we need to adjust to this high-pressure environment in a way that
200 limits unintended adverse consequences.

201 **Recommendations**

202 I offer the following suggestions for approaching this high stakes environment:

203 **(1) CML leadership should select diagnostic approaches with the goal of**
204 **improving individual patient outcomes.** At times this will align with efforts to reduce
205 reportable HAI rates (e.g. reducing urine cultures among catheterized inpatients, limiting
206 CDI testing to those with high pretest probability of disease), and at other times it will not
207 (e.g. introduction of MALDI-TOF for organism identification, adoption of NAAT for CDI
208 detection).

209 **(2) Hospital and IPP leadership should not pressure the CML to alter diagnostic**
210 **practices based on the need to demonstrate lower HAI rates for pay-for-**
211 **performance measures.** Regulatory and accrediting agencies (e.g. CMS, state
212 agencies, Joint Commission) likewise should be alert to changes in diagnostic practice
213 that are associated with changes in HAI rates.

214 **(3) Public health authorities (CDC/NHSN) must be proactive in adjusting HAI**
215 **metrics to changing CML technology.** For example, rapid updating of the master
216 organism lists used by NHSN to define commensals is needed to "catch up" to the
217 increased precision offered by MALDI-TOF. Similarly, measures that are driven by

218 diagnostic test results require risk adjustment when new technology is introduced that
219 changes test performance significantly. Tertiary care teaching hospitals are often the
220 earliest adopters of such technology, putting them at a disadvantage in inter-facility
221 comparisons that are used in pay-for-performance programs.

222 **(4) CMS should reconsider the use of “Laboratory Identified (LabID) event”**
223 **metrics in pay-for-performance programs.** Such metrics do not take into account any
224 clinical information beyond admission date and location, may vary substantially based
225 upon the diagnostic technology applied, and for non-sterile sites may conflate
226 colonization with disease. Although they have the advantage of being less labor-
227 intensive and more objective, they are still subject to gaming and to inter-facility variation
228 in diagnostic practice.

229 **(5) Measures of “diagnostic aggressiveness” should be developed and validated**
230 **for selected HAIs.** For example, rates of blood culture utilization and other aspects of
231 blood culture practice might help inform the adjustment of CLABSI rates for inter-facility
232 comparison. Alternatively, diagnostic-test independent clinical syndromes could be
233 further developed and validated. For example, the rate of healthcare-associated clinical
234 sepsis or SIRS might help interpret the significance of changes in CLABSI rate. If a
235 hospital reduced its CLABSI rate by 90% but saw no change in healthcare-associated
236 sepsis or SIRS events, the implication is that the change in CLABSI may be related to
237 changes in diagnostic aggressiveness or application of surveillance definitions.

238 **(6) CML leadership should be represented on the infection prevention committee,**
239 **and should advocate for the CML as an integral part of the infection prevention**
240 **program.** Only by closely collaborating with the infection prevention program can CML
241 leadership inform the IPP and hospital leaders regarding the impact of changing
242 diagnostic practices on reportable HAI rates. In so doing they can also explain any

243 unintended adverse consequences that may arise from attempts to reduce reportable
244 HAI events via changes in diagnostic practices.

245 In conclusion, the CML is an essential partner in the diagnosis, management and
246 prevention of healthcare-associated infections (29). Increased pressure to improve HAI
247 prevention metrics (for inter-facility comparison and pay-for-performance) must never
248 interfere with optimal diagnostic strategies. Close collaboration between the CML, the
249 IPP, and hospital leadership, along with some adjustments to current HAI definitions and
250 pay-for-performance programs, can help ensure that the focus remains firmly on the
251 patient, and can provide confidence that declining HAI rates are indeed a reflection of
252 safer care.

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356 Table. Characteristics of programs that tie reimbursement to HAI metrics, FY 2017

Program	Money at risk	Incentive possible?	HAIs included
Value based purchasing (VBP)	2% of payments	Yes, program reallocates funds from low to high performers	CAUTI CLABSI SSI (colon/hyst)* <i>C. difficile</i> infection** MRSA bacteremia**
Hospital acquired condition (HAC) reduction	1% of payments	No, penalty only, for worst quartile	CAUTI CLABSI SSI (colon/hyst)* <i>C. difficile</i> infection** MRSA bacteremia**

357 *SSI: surgical site infection (SSI) rates for colon surgery and abdominal hysterectomy

358 **metric is the NHSN LabID event

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